State of Utah v. Daniel Perez-Avila : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Daniel Perez-Avila : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee.
Margaret P Lindsay; Counsel for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Perez-Avila, No. 20040174 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4828
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 20040174-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, FROM 
A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, SECOND 
DEGREE FELONIES; AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
Counsel for Appellant FiLED 
T."." "APELLATE COUF 
JUN 0 3 MR 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 20040174-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY, FROM 
A CONVICTION OF TWO COUNTS OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE, SECOND 
DEGREE FELONIES; AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY (6766) 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
Telephone: (801) 764-5824 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ARGUMENT 1 
POINT I TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED 
AS A RESULT OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW . . . . 1 
POINT II TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
REQUEST THAT THE DUI CONVICTION BE DISMISSED 
AS A LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE TO AUTOMOBILE 
HOMICIDE 4 
CONCLUSION 8 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutory Provisions 
United States Constitution, Amend. IV 3 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(l)(a) 1 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-44.10(3) 1 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) 4, 7 
Cases Cited 
Allisen v. American Legion Post No., 763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988) 6 
Barnhartv. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L. Ed.2d 908 
(2002) 5, 7 
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) 6, 7 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) 3 
State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert, granted, 100 P.3d 220 
(Utah 2004) 3, 4 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DANIEL PEREZ-AVILA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040174-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO FILE A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT 
OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10(l)(a) states "a person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state is considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of 
his breath, blood, or urine" if they enjoy the privileges of driving on Utah's roads. See 
Appellee's Br. at 10. If a person refuses to consent to the test then their license can be 
revoked. Id. On the other hand, if a person is "dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is 
considered to not have withdrawn the consent." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
44.10(3)). 
The State argues that Perez-Avila was unconscious when his blood was drawn. 
TKe State contends that Trooper Hinton testified at trial that the defendant was 
iKiMinscious when the nurse drew his blood. S*>" ipr * Br. at 5. However, the State 
aTio asserts that both Nurse T.wne Nielson and Trooper Kevin Davis testified that the 
$ fendant was unconscious. Id 
Concerning Joanne Nielson's testimony, the State admits that Nurse Nielson stated 
iiat the defendant was awake and conscious when she drew his blood. Id. However, the 
State then contends that Joanne Nielson "almost immediately retracted her testimony and 
stated that she could not remember whether defendant was unconscious when she drew 
his blood." See Appellee ys Br. at 12. The problem with the State's argument is that 
Joanne did not "almost immediately retract" her testimony. It was only on redirect 
examination that she stated that she did not have a clear recollection of that night but that 
she did remember him "moaning and a few things like that." (R. 245). Therefore, Nielson 
did testify that the defendant was conscious. 
Furthermore, in the preliminary hearing Trooper Kevin Davis testified that the 
defendant was unconscious when the defendant drew the defendant's blood. See 
Appellee's Br. at 5. However, at trial Trooper Davis testified that when he arrived at the 
hospital he received the blood sample from Trooper Hinton. (R. 173). Therefore, it 
appears that Davis was not even present at the time the blood was drawn. Consequently, 
he could not have testified to whether or not the defendant was conscious at the time the 
blood was drawn. 
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There appears to be some confusion as to whether or not the defendant was 
conscious at the time his blood was drawn. The defendant asks this court to hold that he 
was conscious. Nurse Nielson's medical background and her interaction with the client at 
the time she drew his blood allow her to better determine if the defendant was conscious 
at the time of the blood draw. 
Since the defendant was conscious when his blood was drawn, we ask this court to 
hold that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The State argues that State v. 
Rodriguez , 2004 UT App 198, 93 P.3d 854, cert, granted, 100 P.3d 220 (Utah 2004), 
does not apply since the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S 757, 86 S.Ct 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), that the dissipation of 
blood-alcohol evidence is an exigency. See Appellee's Br. at 12. However, this Court 
recognized that some jurisdictions have interpreted Schmerber to create a per se rule, but 
this Court conclusively held that "the Schmerber language comports with accepted 
exigent circumstances doctrine" and this court declined to adopt the per se rule advocated 
by the State. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App. 198 at ^ 10. This Court then held that "exigent 
circumstances will be found where the situation involves blood-alcohol evidence, only 
when the 'totality of the circumstances,' supports a finding that the officer 'was 
confronted with an emergency, in which delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the 
circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence/" Id. at *§ 14 (citations omitted). 
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Therefore, Perez-Avila asks this court to follow Rodriguez and require the State to 
show exigent circumstances. Had trial counsel moved to suppress evidence of the 
warrantless blood draw, the trial court would have granted the motion because the State 
could not have met its burden of establishing exigent circumstances sufficient to 
overcome the need for a warrant. Had the blood alcohol evidence been suppressed, it is 
likely that Perez-Avila would not have been convicted of any of the charges, except for 
the open container charge. The State's only sure evidence that Perez-Avila operated a 
vehicle while driving under the influence derived from the illegal blood draw. Without 
that evidence, the State could hot have proven the elements of a DUI, automobile 
homicide, or child abuse. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO 
REQUEST THAT THE DUI CONVICTION BE DISMISSED AS A 
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE TO AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 
Perez-Avila asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request dismissal 
of his driving under the influence conviction because it merged with his convictions for 
automobile homicide because it is a lesser-included offense. Utah Code Annotated § 76-
1-402(3) states: 
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A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when 
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged. 
In Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 Led.2d 
908 (2002), a coal operator brought an action against the Commissioner of Social 
Security alleging that the Commissioner had wrongfully determined that the a purchaser 
of a defunct signatory7 coal operator was a "related person." If the purchaser was held to 
be a "related person" then the purchaser would have been eligible under the Coal Industry 
Retiree Health Benefit Act for health benefits of defunct operator's retired employees. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the act did not allow the Commissioner to 
assign beneficiaries to successor in interest of signatory coal operator. On appeal from 
the district court the Fourth Circuit concluded that the "act was clear and unambiguous 
and that the court was bound to read it exactly as it was written." Id at 439. The Supreme 
Court of the United States stated that 
As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute. 
The first step "is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case." (quoting 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co,, 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S. Ct. 843, 136 L. Ed. 2d 808 
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(1997) citing United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 
S. Ct. 1026, 103 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1997)). The inquiry ceases "if the statutory 
language is unambiguous and 'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.5" 
519 U.S. at 340, 117 S. Ct. 843. A/. 
Furthermore, the U.S.Court in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 
L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), also stated that in order for petitioner, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (I.N.S.), to prevail on their claim that AEDPA and IIRIRA 
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to decide pure questions of law they must 
"overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative 
action and the long outstanding rule requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of 
congressional intent." 121 S.Ct. at 2278. The Supreme Court further explained that when 
a "statutory interpretation invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, there must be a 
clear indication that Congress intended that result." Id. at 2279. Secondly, the court 
stated that if an "otherwise acceptable construction would raise serious constitutional 
problems and an alternative interpretation is fairly possible, the statute must be construed 
to avoid such problems. Id. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court held in Allisen v. American Legion Post No., 
763 P.2d 806 (Utah 1988), that when "statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule 
that a statute should be construed according to its plain language." 763 P.2d at 809. 
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In looking at the plain language of Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402(3) it is clear 
and unambiguous that the legislature intended a lesser included offense to be established 
by "proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged" and therefore the "defendant may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). The State agrees that 
automobile homicide requires the same elements needed to be convicted of a DUI plus 
the additional element of causing the death of another by operating a motor vehicle in a 
negligent or criminally negligent manner. See Appellee ys Br. at 17. Therefore, according 
to the Supreme Court of the United States in Barnhart, since the language is clear and 
unambiguous as to what the statute means then the inquiry stops. This particular statute is 
clear and unambiguous as to what constitutes a lesser included offense. If the legislature 
intended for automobile homicide to be an enhancement statute then according to IKS. 
their needs to be a clear indication in the automobile homicide statute that the legislature 
intended for the defendant to be convicted of DUI plus automobile homicide. Since there 
is not any unclear or ambiguous language in the statute then this court should allow the 
DUI to merge into automobile homicide which is required by § 76-1-402(3). 
The State further argues that DUI and Automobile Homicide serve different 
purposes and punish distinct acts. See Appellee's Br. at 17. The State contends that the 
purpose of the DUI statute is to increase road safety by prohibiting intoxicated persons 
from driving on Utah's roads. Id The State then argues that automobile homicide differs 
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from DUI because automobile homicide is an offense against the person. This argument 
fails because the purpose of DUFs as mentioned by the State is to increase road safety or 
in other words to protect people. The reason that people are charged with DUI is to 
discourage them from negligently committing automobile homicide. The lesser offense of 
DUI was created to deter individuals from committing the greater offense of automobile 
homicide, and therefore a DUI charge should merge into automobile homicide. 
Accordingly, Perez-Avila asks that this Court find that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to request a dismissal of the DUI conviction because of its merger into the 
automobile homicide convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in the Brief of Appellant, and as further set forth herein, Perez-Avila 
asks that this Court reverse his convictions for automobile homicide, driving under the 
influence, and child abuse. 
SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 2005. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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